As a necessary consequence of their implementation, employee social media privacy laws have prevented at least some discrimination by employers. 6 Employers are to refrain from requesting any type of access to employee or prospective employee social media accounts, and are also welladvised to hire third parties to monitor any such profiles when monitoring is believed to be necessary. 7 While failure to follow these rules can result in unwanted legal consequences, 8 abiding by them might also give employers a false sense of security against liability for employment practices.
Most research dealing with employer liability for discrimination based on information accessed through social media examines situations in which an employer gains access to protected information about an employee through the employee's social media account(s), and accordingly takes adverse action against the employee.
9 This Note explores a similar, but generally overlooked situation: when employees themselves are lawfully connected with one another on various social media platforms, exposing coworkers to personal information about one another. 10 This exposure creates a risk-albeit an indirect one-for even those employers that strive to avoid discriminatory decision-making.
Part I of this Note discusses current employee privacy protections, including recent state social media privacy laws and their relevant similarities and differences. Part II discusses current employment-related antidiscrimination laws, and provides an overview of how courts analyze 87-88 (2011) . 8 See discussion infra Part III.B. 9 See, e.g., Bannister et al., supra note 6 (discussing employers' explicit use of protected class information in employment decisions).
10 See Janna Andersen & Lee Rainie, Millennials Will Make Online Sharing in Networks a Lifelong Habit, PEW RESEARCH CTR., (July 9, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/2010/07/09/millennials-willmake-online-sharing-in-networks-a-lifelong-habit/ (finding that the general pattern of disclosure on social media that characterizes the millennial generation now, will likely remain constant until at least the year 2020). associated individual disparate treatment cases.
11 Part III explores the heightened potential for employer discriminatory liability that results from the expansion of information sharing on social media websites. Part III also surveys recent cases in which employers were exposed to liability by gathering information that led to discovery of covert protected characteristic information of a current or prospective employee. Indeed, even when employers abide by existing social media privacy laws, they may have a false sense of security against liability for workplace discrimination. Part IV argues that, because the Internet has transformed the world into a highly interconnected information hub, Staub v. Proctor Hospital's theory of "cat's paw" liability 12 should not be expanded to allow employer liability for the discriminatory animus of non-supervisory employees.
I. EMPLOYEE PRIVACY PROTECTIONS ONLINE
Employees with personal social media accounts are protected from intrusions into their privacy through both state social media privacy laws 13 and the Federal Stored Communications Act (SCA).
14 Although federal 11 In an individual disparate treatment claim, an employee alleges that he or she was intentionally discriminated against on the basis of a protected characteristic. See also discussion infra Part II.
12 Judge Posner coined the "cat's paw liability" phrase in employment discrimination law in Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). The term "cat's paw" is derived from a 17th century fable in which a cat burns its paws after being lured into getting chestnuts from an open fire by a deceptive monkey. The idea, then, is that an employee can hold an innocent employer (the cat) responsible for the discriminatory animus of a supervisor (the monkey). Under the so-called "cat's paw" theory of liability, an employer can be held liable for discriminatory animus of one of its employees, when that animus (directly or indirectly) leads to an adverse action against the employee. See also discussion infra Part II.B.
13 Employers conducting business in a number of states are bound by the following social media privacy statutes: ARK. CODE ANN. nothing has been enacted, leaving states to address the issue of social media privacy in the workplace on an individualized basis. 16 As a result, the current state of social media protection law is varied and complex. 17 Indeed, "one of the only points of uniformity" among these state laws is the basic prohibition they place upon employers to refrain from requesting or requiring that applicants or employees disclose their username, password, or other information needed to access a personal social media account. 18 Most of the statutes place this prohibition on employers only, and typically define "employer" in a way that includes the employer's representatives or agents.
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The laws, indeed, prevent what could be employer coercion. By asking employees or prospective employees to share their social media usernames and/or passwords, an employer places its employees in a difficult situation. If an employee denies the employer's request, he or she risks being viewed negatively. On the other hand, if an employee provides the requested access, the employer is now privy to potentially sensitive, personal information about the employee's private life. What the state laws fail to contemplate, however, are situations in which employees are lawfully connected with their employers, supervisors, or other employees. The assumption here is that the (1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility, and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents the authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while in electronic storage in such a system shall be liable for damages. ("The language of these state laws endeavors to protect against the same employer practices, but the laws' inconsistencies create a 'complex patchwork' of laws of varying scopes.") 18 Grider, supra note 3, at 182. 19 See sources cited supra note 13.
employer did not request or require access in any way, and therefore did not violate any applicable state law.
20
Research shows that the aforementioned privacy laws may be largely unnecessary-that employers are generally advised to refrain from requesting access to employee social media profiles in the first place. 21 But in an increasingly connected world where individuals are inclined to share exceedingly personal information about themselves on the Internet, even those employers that take steps to avoid fault by abiding by state social media privacy laws and the SCA may remain blind to the possibility of incurring liability for discrimination through biases of their other employees, who, as co-workers, are even more likely to be connected with one another online. 22 See Charlie Osborne, Generation Y 'Friending' Facebook colleagues, insight on career prospects, ZDNET (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/article/generation-y-friending-facebookcolleagues-insight-on-career-prospects-survey/ ("The Gen Y are using social networks as an extension of their professional profile, even though they are also using the same platforms to socialize with family and friends. Sixty-four percent of the group do not list their employer on their profiles, yet they add an average of 16 co-workers each to their contact lists."); id. (clarifying that 84 percent include at least one connection with a coworker on their social media profile; 53 percent have five or more; and 40 percent friend more than ten); see also Kenneth Olmstead et al., Social Media and the Workplace, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 22, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/06/22/social-media-and-the-workplace/ (finding that 17 percent of workers use social media on the job in order to learn about someone they work with).
individuals cannot be paid differently on the basis of their sex. 23 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions against employees or prospective employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 24 In addition, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits employers from discriminating against employees that are forty years of age or older, 25 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits employers from making hiring decisions or altering application procedures in ways that adversely affect individuals with disabilities. 26 Most recently, the Genetic Information in Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) was enacted to prohibit employers from receiving any type of access to its employees' genetic information-namely, their family medical history. 27 In an effort to "achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of [traditionally advantaged] employees over other employees," workplace antidiscrimination laws provide causes of action to certain groups of employees who believe that their employer has intentionally and unlawfully discriminated against them.
28

A. Application of Discrimination Laws
Courts enforce individual discrimination laws in one of two ways. In 1973, the Supreme Court first established a three-part burden-shifting framework.
29 This burden-shifting framework, now widely known as the "pretext model," operates such that even circumstantial evidence of discrimination may allow a factfinder to infer that intentional discrimination has, in fact, occurred. carries the burden of proof, 31 and must first plead facts that establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 32 Namely, an employee must show that (1) he or she is a member of a protected class; (2) he or she was qualified for the job in question; (3) that an adverse action occurred; and (4) that the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination. 33 In a discriminatory hiring case, the "inference of discrimination" could be met by showing that "the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications."
34 Once a plaintiffemployee establishes a prima facie case, it creates an inference of discrimination, which the employer can rebut with evidence that discrimination was not the reason for the adverse action-that the plaintiffemployee was, instead, rejected for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. 35 An employer meets its burden by simply articulating any non-discriminatory reason for its action. 36 Indeed, employers have a burden of production, not persuasion, and their fulfillment of this burden eliminates the presumption of discrimination originally established by the plaintiff's prima facie case. 37 If an employer provides, and the court accepts, a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff-employee, who must produce evidence to show that the so-called non-discriminatory reason articulated by the employer is simply a pretext for discrimination. 38 The evidence of pretext can be circumstantial, creating an issue of fact, as long as it shows that the employer's alleged reason is not the true reason for the adverse action in question. 39 In ] has assigned respondent's participation in unlawful conduct against it as a cause for his rejection. We think this suffices to discharge petitioner's burden of proof at this stage and to meet respondent's prima facie case of discrimination."). 38 Id. at 804-06. 39 Id.
negative prior treatment of the employee during his or her employment, use of comparators, 40 and evidence that could reveal the employer's general policy or practice of discrimination. 41 When an employee or prospective employee provides evidence that meets its pretext burden, the question of whether there was intentional discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic is one of fact.
42
In 1988, the Supreme Court contemplated a second model for examining cases of individual discrimination when it was confronted with a unique set of facts in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 43 The plaintiff, a female senior manager, sued her employer, Price Waterhouse, for its failure to promote her to partner level, alleging that the employer's action constituted discrimination on the basis of sex, a violation of Title VII. 44 Price Waterhouse admitted that it refused to promote her to partner because a significant percentage of the hiring committee viewed her as overly aggressive, abrasive, and difficult to work with. 45 On that basis, Price Waterhouse argued that the plaintiff could not show that she would have been promoted to partner if it were not for her status as a female, as was necessary to prove intentional discrimination under Title VII-she could not prove that but-for her sex, she would have been promoted. 46 The Supreme Court disagreed with the employer's argument, holding that when an employee proves that his or her protected class status played a role in an adverse employment action, the employer must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision without consideration of the protected characteristic in question. 47 In doing so, the Court provided a cause of action to a class of cases that the pretext model could not reach, through what is 40 For example, the Court noted that it would be "especially relevant to . . . a showing [of pretext] would be evidence that white employees involved in acts against petitioner of comparable seriousness to the 'stall-in' were nevertheless retained or rehired." Id. at 805. 41 now labeled the "mixed-motive" framework of analysis. 48 In enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified the mixed-motive framework, providing employees with a cause of action against discriminatory employers when an employer's legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its adverse action is inextricably intertwined with a stereotype specific to a protected class. 49 The current consensus is that the mixed-motive framework, like the pretext framework, allows plaintiff-employees to succeed on a claim of individual discrimination short of any direct evidence of such discrimination.
50
Because neither of the frameworks requires direct evidence of discrimination, the proper application of one over the other is unclear.
51 More importantly, the mere fact that circumstantial evidence of discrimination suffices to prove that such discrimination occurred can be problematic in and of itself. 52 This Note focuses on a particular type of circumstantial evidence of discrimination, which proves to be especially problematic: discriminatory animus of agents of the employer, rather than the employer itself. (explaining that while lower courts have, in large part, determined that the models are alternatives that the plaintiff may select when bringing his or her intentional discrimination case, there is still conflict regarding the correct application of the two frameworks). Furthermore, the Supreme Court's decision in Desert Palace failed to indicate whether the mixed-motive framework would completely supplant the pretext framework.
52 See discussion infra Part II.B. 53 See discussion infra Part II.B.
B. Circumstantial Evidence of Intentional Discrimination: Staub and Cat's Paw Liability
In Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 54 the Supreme Court examined whether a supervisor's animus against an employee for his military obligations, coupled with the employer's adverse action on the basis of that animus, could serve as anti-military discrimination in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). 55 The Court held that the supervisor's anti-military animus, along with the employer's resultant adverse action violated USERRA. 56 After Staub, a supervisor's discriminatory animus against an employee that induces an employer to take an adverse action against an employee can serve as evidence of pretext in the pretext model, as well as circumstantial evidence of discrimination as a motivating factor under the mixed-motive model. 57 This so-called "cat's paw liability" provides plaintiffs with a broad opportunity for success in claims of intentional employment discrimination, and expands employers' exposure to liability under those claims.
58
Narrowing the opinion in Staub, the Supreme Court indicated in a footnote that it did not intend to express a view on "whether the employer would be liable if a co-worker, rather than a supervisor, committed a discriminatory act that influenced the ultimate employment decision."
59 Most lower courts appeared to follow this narrow interpretation of Staub, declining to extend such "cat's paw liability" to an employer accused of an adverse action against an employee based on a non-supervisor employee's 57 See Staub, 562 U.S. at 422. 58 As explained supra note 12, this type of discrimination is described by the term "cat's paw" based on a 17th century fable in which a cat burns its paws after being lured into getting chestnuts from an open fire by a deceptive monkey. Similarly, an employee can hold an innocent employer (the cat) responsible for the discriminatory animus of a supervisor (the monkey).
59 Staub, 562 U.S. at 422 n.4. discriminatory animus. 60 A number of other courts, however, including the First, Second, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal and various district courts, have declined to preclude such a possibility. 61 What began as courts inferring that employers could be liable for co-worker animus under the cat's paw theory 62 has now evolved into many courts expressly holding that employers are, in fact, liable under the theory for the animus of a co-worker.
For example, in 2012, a district court within the Seventh Circuit, while denying a plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, indicated that the plaintiff would "not [have] be[en] precluded from asserting a claim based on a cat's paw theory of liability simply because . . . [the employee who allegedly had discriminatory animus towards the plaintiff] was a co-worker and not a supervisor." 63 Later, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued two decisions that gave further insight into its views on the matter: in Matthews v . Waukesha County, the court dismissed a plaintiff's claim against her employer for the alleged discriminatory animus of a human resources assistant employee, but nevertheless declined to foreclose the possibility that such an employee could serve as a source of discriminatory animus in disparate treatment claims. 64 In [A]n employer can be held liable under Title VII if: the plaintiff's co-worker makes statements maligning the plaintiff, for discriminatory reasons and with the intent to cause the plaintiff's firing; the co-worker's discriminatory acts proximately cause the plaintiff to be fired; and the employer acts negligently by allowing the co-worker's acts to achieve their desired effect though it knows (or reasonably should know) of the discriminatory motivation. 66 
III. ONLINE SOCIAL MEDIA: THE HEIGHTENED EXPOSURE OF EMPLOYERS
TO DISCRIMINATORY LIABILITY A social media website is an online forum where the majority of the content on the site is user-generated, there is a high level of interaction between its users, and in which the website is easily integrated with other websites. 67 Social media websites include various online platforms, including the increasingly prevalent social networking websites such as Facebook, decision-making employee with discriminatory animus provided factual information or input that may have affected the adverse employment action"). 65 Simpson, 780 F.3d at 798 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). However, nondecision-making employee statements are unlikely to be admitted as evidence under Federal Rule of encouraged to hire an outside party for any necessary monitoring. 75 The simple act of hiring a third party to monitor social media can protect against unwanted liability on the part of employers by preventing the employer's own development of any possible discriminatory animus. 76 In lawfully monitoring the social profiles of employees, employers may, indeed, discover information that they (rightfully) have the power to act upon, without exposure to liability under discrimination laws or the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 77 Several situations in which employers lawfully took adverse actions on the basis of social media posts of employees illustrate this idea. In 2009, Domino's, a well-known pizza delivery chain, fired two employees and brought criminal charges against them after the employer discovered that the employees posted a video that resulted in severe damage to the company's reputation. 78 Similarly, Virgin Airlines fired a number of its employees after they unduly criticized their employer's safety standards on Facebook. 79 And, in the wake of the "Black Lives Matter" protests in Ferguson, Missouri, a hospital in Texas lawfully fired an employee after she posted a "very racist" comment about the protest on Facebook.
